Here you being my view of worldwide warfare, with videos from YouTube and notebooks provientes from Wikipedia. I hope you like my blog, and they are always wanting to comment without taboos. Enjoying this world of strategy!
The 1st-century BC Greek historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus indicates that the Roman institution of slavery began with the legendary founder Romulus giving Roman fathers the right to sell their own children into slavery, and kept growing with the expansion of the Roman state. Slave ownership was most widespread throughout the Roman citizenry from the Second Punic War (218–201 BC) to the 4th century AD.
The Twelve Tables, Rome's oldest legal code, have brief references to slavery, indicating that the institution was of long standing. In the tripartite division of law by the jurist Ulpian (2nd century AD), slavery was an aspect of the ius gentium, the customary international law held in common among all peoples. The "law of nations" was neither natural law, which existed in nature and governed animals as well as humans, nor civil law, which was the body of laws specific to a people. All human beings are born free (liberi) under natural law, but slavery was held to be a practice common to all nations, who might then have specific civil laws pertaining to slaves. In ancient warfare, the victor had the right under the ius gentium to enslave a defeated population; however, if a settlement had been reached through diplomatic negotiations or formal surrender, the people were by custom to be spared violence and enslavement. The ius gentium was not a legal code, and any force it had depended on "reasoned compliance with standards of international conduct."
In 216 BCE, Marcus Ameilius Lepidus, late consul and augur, was honoured by his sons with three days of gladiatora munera in the Forum Romanum, using twenty-two pairs of gladiators. Ten years later, Scipio Africanus gave a commemorative munus in Iberia for his father and uncle, casualties in the Punic Wars. High status non-Romans, and possibly Romans too, volunteered as his gladiators. The context of the Punic Wars and Rome's near-disastrous defeat at the Battle of Cannae (216 BCE) link these early games to munificence, the celebration of military victory and the religious expiation of military disaster; these munera appear to serve a morale-raising agenda in an era of military threat and expansion. The next recorded munus, held for the funeral of Publius Liciniusin in 183 BCE, was more extravagant. It involved three days of funeral games, 120 gladiators, and public distribution of meat.
The enthusiastic adoption of gladiatoria munera by Rome's Iberian allies shows how easily, and how early, the culture of the gladiator munus permeated places far from Rome itself. By 174 BC, "small" Roman munera (private or public), provided by an editor of relatively low importance, may have been so commonplace and unremarkable they were not considered worth recording:
Many gladiatorial games were given in that year, some unimportant, one noteworthy beyond the rest — that of Titus Flamininus which he gave to commemorate the death of his father, which lasted four days, and was accompanied by a public distribution of meats, a banquet, and scenic performances. The climax of the show which was big for the time was that in three days seventy four gladiators fought.
In 105 BCE, the ruling consuls offered Rome its first taste of state-sponsored "barbarian combat" demonstrated by gladiators from Capua, as part of a training program for the military. It proved immensely popular. The ludi (state games), sponsored by the ruling elite and dedicated to deity a divine or heroic ancestor, began to include the gladiator contests formerly restricted to private munera.
30,000 (including Crixus) killed by Lucius Gellius Publicola, 6000 crucified by Crassus, 5000 crucified by Pompeii, almost all others killed or crucified
Unspecified but heavy
(50, 1,000, or 4,000 lost through decimation)
According to the differing sources and their interpretation, Spartacus either was an auxiliary from the Roman legions later condemned to slavery, or a captive taken by the legions. Spartacus was trained at the gladiatorial school near Capua, belonging to Lentulus Batiatus. In 73 BC, Spartacus was among a group of gladiators plotting an escape.
The plot was betrayed but about 70 men seized kitchen implements, fought their way free from the school, and seized several wagons of gladiatorial weapons and armor. The escaped slaves defeated a small force sent after them, plundered the region surrounding Capua, recruited many other slaves into their ranks, and eventually retired to a more defensible position on Mount Vesuvius.
Once free, the escaped gladiators chose Spartacus and two Gallic slaves—Crixus and Oenomaus—as their leaders. Although Roman authors assumed that the slaves were a homogeneous group with Spartacus as their leader, they may have projected their own hierarchical view of military leadership onto the spontaneous organization of the slaves, reducing other slave leaders to subordinate positions in their accounts.
Now you are about to see the view that the generals wish to have, and see the flexible and heavily armed romans legions against the slaves with hungry of freedom led by professional gladiators, the fight will decide the future of Rome and the freedom and peace of the people on both sides, and the world will not be the same before!
In 204 King Ptolemy IV Philopator of Egypt died, leaving the throne to his six-year old son Ptolemy V. Philip V of Macedon and Antiochus the Great of the Seleucid Empire decided to exploit the weakness of the young king by taking Ptolemaic territory for themselves and they signed a secret pact defining spheres of interest. Philip first turned his attention to the free Greek city states in Thrace and near the Dardanelles. His success at taking cities such as Kios worried the states of Rhodes and Pergamon who also had interests in the area. In 201, Philip launched a campaign in Asia Minor, besieging the Ptolemaic city of Samos and capturing Miletus. Again, this disconcerted Rhodes and Pergamon and Philip responded by ravaging the territory of the latter. Philip then invaded Caria but the Rhodians and Pergamonians successfully blockaded his fleet in Bargylia, forcing him to spend the winter with his army in a country which offered very few provisions. At this point, although they appeared to have the upper hand, Rhodes and Pergamon still feared Philip so much that they sent an appeal to the most powerful state in the Mediterranean: Rome.
Rome had just emerged victorious from the Second Punic War against Hannibal. Up to this point in her history, she had taken very little interest in the affairs of the eastern Mediterranean. The First Macedonian War against Philip V had been over the issue of Illyria and was resolved by the Peace of Phoenice in 205. Very little in Philip's recent actions in Thrace and Asia Minor could be said to concern Rome personally. Nevertheless, the Romans listened to the appeal from Rhodes and Pergamon and sent a party of three ambassadors to investigate matters in Greece. The ambassadors found very little enthusiasm for a war against Philip until they reached Athens. Here they met King Attalus I of Pergamon and diplomats from Rhodes. At the same time, Athens declared war on Macedon and Philip sent a force to invade Attica. The Roman ambassadors held a meeting with the Macedonian general and urged Macedon to leave every Greek city in peace and come to an arrangement with Rhodes and Pergamon to adjudicate damages from the latest war. The Macedonian general evacuated Athenian territory and handed the Roman ultimatum to his master Philip.
Philip, who had managed to slip past the blockade and arrive back home, rejected the Roman ultimatum out of hand. He renewed his attack on Athens and began another campaign in the Dardanelles, besieging the important city of Abydus. Here, in the autumn of 200, a Roman ambassador reached him with a second ultimatum, urging him not to attack any Greek state or to seize any territory belonging to Ptolemy and to go to arbitration with Rhodes and Pergamon. It was obvious that Rome was now intent on making war on Philip and at the very same time the ambassador was delivering the second ultimatum, a Roman force was disembarking in Illyria. Philip's protests that he was not in violation of any of the terms of the Peace of Phoenice he had signed with Rome were in vain. Polybius reports that during the siege of Abydus, Philip had grown impatient and sent a message to the besieged that the walls would be stormed and that if anybody wished to commit suicide or surrender they had 3 days to do so. The citizens promptly killed all the women and children of the city, threw their valuables into the sea and fought to the last man. This story illustrates the reputation for atrocities that Philip had earned by this time during his efforts at expanding Macedonian power and influence through conquest of Greek cities.
Philip found himself with few active allies in Greece, but there was little enthusiasm for the Roman cause either, the Greeks remembering the frequent brutality of the legions during the First Macedonian War. Most states adopted a policy of waiting to see which way the war went. For the first two years, the Roman campaign was lacklustre. Publius Sulpicius Galba made little headway against Philip and his successor, Publius Villius, had to deal with a mutiny among his own men. In 198, Villius handed command over to the Titus Quinctius Flamininus, who would prove a very different kind of general. Flamininus was not yet thirty and was a self-proclaimed ardent Philhellene. He introduced a new Roman policy for winning the war. Up to this point, the Romans had merely ordered Philip to stop attacking Greek cities ("peace in Greece"). Now Flamininus demanded that he should withdraw all his garrisons from the Greek cities he already held and confine himself to Macedon ("liberty for the Greeks").
Flamininus led a vigorous campaign against Philip in 198, forcing him to retreat to Thessaly. The cities of the Achaean League, traditionally favourable to Macedon, had been too busy with their war against Sparta to take any part in the Second Macedonian War so far. Roman success against Philip persuaded many of them to abandon their pro-Macedonian stance. Others, such as Argos, remained loyal to Philip.
about 33,400 men or about the same number as the Macedonians according to Plutarch
25,500 men according to Plutarch
Casualties and losses
about 2,000 killed or wounded
5,000 killed, 1,000 captured
Philip declared his willingness to make peace, but his overtures came at a critical time for Flamininus just as elections were being held in Rome. Flamininus was eager to take the credit for ending the war but he did not yet know whether his command would be prolonged. He decided to negotiate with Philip while he awaited the outcome of the elections. If they meant he was to be recalled to Rome, then he would make a quick peace deal with the Macedonian. If, on the other hand, his command was extended, then he decided to break off the negotiations and declare war on Philip again. Flamininus and Philip met at Nicaea in Locris in November 198. To prolong the proceedings, Flamininus insisted that all his allies should be present at the negotiations. Flamininus reiterated his demands that Philip should withdraw from the whole of Greece. Philip, who was prepared to give up all his recent conquests in Thrace and Asia Minor, could not go this far. Flamininus persuaded him that the problem was the Greek states who were insisting on this point and suggested he should send an embassy to the Roman Senate. Philip followed his advice but at this moment Flamininus learned that his command had been extended and his friends in Rome successfully interfered with the Macedonian negotiations in Rome so the war could continue. Seeing things were going Rome's way, Philip's few remaining allies abandoned him (with the exception of Acarnania) and he was forced to raise an army of 25,000 mercenaries. The legions of Titus confronted and defeated Philip at the Aous, However the decisive encounter came at Cynoscephalae in Thessaly in June 197 BC.
Now you are about to see the view that the generals wish to have, and see the Phalanx infanty and the Companion Cavalry of Macedon against the flexible and heavily armed romans legions and their supports, the fight will decide the future of Greece and which one is the best way of fighting wars, and the world will not be the same before!
By the middle of the 3rd century BC, the Romans had secured the whole of the Italian peninsula. Over the course of the preceding one hundred years, Rome had defeated every rival that stood in the way of their domination of the Italian peninsula. Carthage considered itself the dominant naval power in the western Mediterranean. It originated as a Phoenician colony in Africa, near modern Tunis, and gradually became the center of a civilization whose hegemony reached along the North African coast and deep in its hinterland, and also included the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, Corsica, a limited area in southern Spain, and the western half of Sicily. The conflict began after both Rome and Carthage intervened in Messana, the Sicilian city closest to the Italian peninsula.
Hannibal was one of the sons of Hamilcar Barca, a grand Carthaginian leader. He had two brothers, Hasdrubal and Mago. His brothers-in-law were Hasdrubal the Fair and the Numidian king Naravas. After Carthage's defeat in the First Punic War, Hamilcar set out to improve his family's and Carthage's fortunes. With that in mind and supported by Gades, Hamilcar began the subjugation of the tribes of the Iberian Peninsula. Carthage at the time was in such a poor state that its navy was unable to transport his army to Iberia; instead, Hamilcar had to march it towards the Pillars of Hercules and transport it across the Strait of Gibraltar. Hannibal much later said that when he came upon his father and begged to go with him, Hamilcar agreed and demanded that he swear that as long as he lived he would never be a friend of Rome. There is even an account of him at a very young age begging his father to take him to an overseas war. In the story, Hannibal's father took him up and brought him to a sacrificial chamber. Hamilcar held Hannibal over the fire roaring in the chamber and made him swear that he would never be a friend of Rome. Hannibal's father went about the conquest of Hispania. When his father drowned in battle, Hannibal's brother-in-law Hasdrubal succeeded to his command of the army with Hannibal serving as an officer under him. Hasdrubal pursued a policy of consolidation of Carthage's Iberian interests, even signing a treaty with Rome whereby Carthage would not expand north of the Ebro River, so long as Rome did not expand south of it. Hasdrubal also endeavoured to consolidate Carthaginian power through diplomatic relationships with native tribes. After he assumed command, Hannibal spent two years consolidating his holdings and completing the conquest of Hispania south of the Ebro. However, Rome, fearing the growing strength of Hannibal in Iberia, made an alliance with the city of Saguntum, which lay a considerable distance south of the River Ebro and claimed the city as its protectorate. Hannibal perceived this as a breach of the treaty signed with Hasdrubal and so he laid siege to the city, which fell after eight months. Rome reacted to this apparent violation of the treaty and demanded justice from Carthage. In view of Hannibal's great popularity, the Carthaginian government did not repudiate Hannibal's actions, and the war he sought was declared at the end of the year. Hannibal was now determined to carry the war into the heart of Italy by a rapid march through Hispania and southern Gaul.
Hannibal departed New Carthage in late spring of 218 BC. He fought his way through the northern tribes to the Pyrenees, subduing the tribes through clever mountain tactics and stubborn fighting. He left a detachment of 11,000 troops to garrison the newly conquered region. At the Pyrenees, he released another 11,000 Iberian troops who showed reluctance to leave their homeland. Hannibal reportedly entered Gaul with 50,000 foot soldiers and 9,000 horsemen. Hannibal recognized that he still needed to cross the Pyrenees, the Alps, and many significant rivers. Additionally, he would have to contend with opposition from the Gauls, whose territory he passed through. Starting in the spring of 218 BC, he easily fought his way through the northern tribes to the Pyrenees and, by conciliating the Gaulish chiefs along his passage, reached the Rhône River before the Romans could take any measures to bar his advance. Arriving at the Rhône in September, Hannibal's army numbered 38,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and 37 war elephants.
In December of 218 BC, Hannibal's perilous march brought him into the Roman territory and frustrated the attempts of the enemy to fight out the main issue on foreign ground. His sudden appearance among the Gauls of the Po Valley, moreover, enabled him to detach those tribes from their new allegiance to the Romans before the latter could take steps to check the rebellion.
Publius Cornelius Scipio, the consul who commanded the Roman force sent to intercept Hannibal, had not expected Hannibal to make an attempt to cross the Alps, since the Romans were prepared to fight the war in Iberia. With a small detachment still positioned in Gaul, Scipio made an attempt to intercept Hannibal. Through prompt decision and speedy movement, he succeeded in transporting his army to Italy by sea, in time to meet Hannibal. Hannibal's forces moved through the Po Valley and were engaged in a small confrontation at Ticinus. Here, Hannibal forced the Romans, by virtue of his superior cavalry, to evacuate the plain of Lombardy. While the victory was minor, it encouraged the Gauls and Ligurians to join the Carthaginian cause, whose troops bolstered his army back to 40,000 men. Scipio was severely injured and retreated across the river Trebia to camp at Placentia with his army intact. But this gain was not without its loss, as Sempronius avoided Hannibal's watchfulness, slipped around his flank, and joined his colleague in his camp near the Trebbia River near Placentia. There, in December of the same year, Hannibal had an opportunity to show his superior military skill at Trebia; after wearing down the excellent Roman infantry he cut it to pieces by a surprise attack from an ambush in the flank.
Having secured his position in northern Italy by this victory, Hannibal quartered his troops for the winter with the Gauls, whose support for him abated. In the Spring of 217 BC, Hannibal decided to find a more reliable base of operations farther south. Expecting Hannibal to carry on advancing to Rome, Cnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius (the new Consuls of Rome) took their armies to block the Eastern and Western routes Hannibal could use to get to Rome.
Strength
30,000 men:
(20,000 heavy infantry 10,000 cavalry, 37 war elephants)
42,000 men:
(18,000 legionaries, 20,000 Italian allies, 4,000 cavalry,
Casualties and losses
4-5,000 Infantry, Some Elephants
Approximately 26,000-28,000, up to 32,000 total casualties
Arriving in Etruria in the spring of 217 BC, Hannibal decided to lure the main Roman army, under Flaminius, into a pitched battle, by devastating under his very own eye the area he had been sent to protect. At the same time, Hannibal tried to break the allegiance of Rome’s allies, by proving that Flaminius was powerless to protect them. Despite this, Hannibal found Flaminius still passively encamped at Arretium. Unable to draw Flaminius into battle by mere devastation, Hannibal marched boldly around his opponent’s left flank and effectively cut Flaminius off from Rome. Advancing through the uplands of Etruria, Hannibal provoked Flaminius to a hasty pursuit and, catching him in a defile on the shore of Lake Trasimenus, destroyed his army in the waters or on the adjoining slopes while killing Flaminius as well. He had now disposed of the only field force which could check his advance upon Rome, but, realizing that without siege engines he could not hope to take the capital, he preferred to exploit his victory by passing into central and southern Italy and encouraging a general revolt against the sovereign power. After Lake Trasimeno, Hannibal stated, "I have not come to fight Italians, but on behalf of the Italians against Rome".
In the spring of 216 BC, Hannibal took the initiative and seized the large supply depot at Cannae in the Apulian plain. He thus placed himself between the Romans and their crucial source of supply. As Polybius notes, the capture of Cannae "caused great commotion in the Roman army; for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that distressed them, but the fact that it commanded the surrounding district". The consuls, resolving to confront Hannibal, marched southward in search of the Carthaginian general. After two days’ march, they found him on the left bank of the Aufidus River and encamped six miles (10 km) away. Consul Varro, who was in command on the first day, is presented by ancient sources as a man of reckless nature and hubris, and was determined to defeat Hannibal. While the Romans were approaching Cannae, a small portion of Hannibal's forces ambushed the Roman army. Varro successfully repelled the Carthaginian attack and continued on his way to Cannae. This victory, though essentially a mere skirmish with no lasting strategic value, greatly bolstered the confidence of the Roman army, perhaps to overconfidence on Varro's part. Paullus, however, was opposed to the engagement as it was taking shape. Unlike Varro, he was prudent and cautious, and he believed it was foolish to fight on open ground, despite the Romans' numerical strength. This was especially true since Hannibal held the advantage in cavalry (both in quality and numerical terms). Despite these misgivings, Paullus thought it unwise to withdraw the army after the initial success, and camped two-thirds of the army east of the Aufidus River, sending the remainder of his men to fortify a position on the opposite side. The purpose of this second camp was to cover the foraging parties from the main camp and harass those of the enemy. The two armies stayed in their respective locations for two days. During the second of these two days (August 1), Hannibal, aware that Varro would be in command the following day, left his camp and offered battle. Paullus, however, refused. When his request was rejected, Hannibal, recognizing the importance of the Aufidus' water to the Roman troops, sent his cavalry to the smaller Roman camp to harass water-bearing soldiers that were found outside the camp fortifications. According to Polybius, Hannibal's cavalry boldly rode up to the edge of the Roman encampment, causing havoc and thoroughly disrupting the supply of water to the Roman camp.
Killed: 53,500-75,000 Romans and allied infantry 2,700 Roman and allied cavalry Captured: 3,000 Roman and allied infantry 1,500 Roman and allied cavalry
Now you are about to see the view that the generals wish to have, and see the Gaul,Iberian andCarthaginian infantry with supported of Numidian and Iberian cavalry against the flexibleandarmed roman legions on open field, the fight will decide the future of West Mediterranean, and the world will not be the same before!
Alexander assumed the kingship of Macedon following the death of his father Philip II, who had unifiedmost of the city-states of mainland Greece under Macedonian hegemony in a federation called the League of Corinth. After reconfirming Macedonian rule by quashing a rebellion of southern Greek city-states and staging a short but bloody excursion against Macedon's northern neighbors, Alexander set out east against the Achaemenid Persian Empire, under its "King of Kings" (the title all Achaemenid kings went by), Darius III. In 335 BC, Alexander crossed the Hellespont into Asia. It took over one hundred triremes to transport the entire Macedonian army, but the Persians decided to ignore the movement.
In these early months, Darius still refused to take Alexander seriously or mount a serious challenge to Alexander's movements. Memnon of Rhodes, the Greek mercenary who aligned himself with the Persians, advocated a scorched Earth strategy. He wanted the Persians to destroy the land in front of Alexander, which he hoped would force Alexander's army to starve, and then to turn back. Eventually, with Alexander advancing deeper into Persian territory, Darius put Memnon in control of an army, and told him to finally confront Alexander. The Battle of the Granicus River in May 334 BC was fought in Northwestern Asia Minor (modern-day Turkey), near the site of Troy. After crossing the Hellespont, Alexander advanced up the road to the capital of the Satrapy of Phrygia. The various satraps of the Persian empire gathered with their forces at the town of Zelea and offered battle on the banks of the Granicus River. Alexander ultimately fought many of his battles on a river bank. By doing so, he was able to minimize the advantage the Persians had in numbers. Alexander a second-in-command, Parmenion, suggested crossing the river upstream and attacking at dawn the next day, but Alexander attacked immediately. This tactic caught the Persians off guard. The battle started with a cavalry and light infantry attack from the Macedonian left, so the Persians heavily reinforced that side. However, by this point, Alexander led the horse companions in their classic wedge-shaped charge, and smashed into the center of the Persian line. Several high-ranking Persian nobles were killed by Alexander himself or his bodyguards, although Alexander was stunned by an axe-blow from a Persian nobleman named Spithridates. Before the noble could deal a death-blow, however, he was himself killed by Black Cleitus. Alexander's horse was killed, although he was not at the time riding his belovedBucephalus, either because Bucephalus was lame or because Alexander believed this battle to be too dangerous for Bucephalus. The Macedonian cavalry opened a hole in the Persian line, and the Macedonian infantry charged through to engage the poor quality Persian infantry in the rear. At this, and with many of their leaders already dead, both flanks of the Persian cavalry retreated, and the infantry was cut down as it fled. After Alexander's forces successfully defeated the Persians at the Battle of the Granicus, Darius took personal charge of his army, gathered a large army from the depths of the empire, and maneuvered to cut the Greek line of supply, requiring Alexander to countermarch his forces, setting the stage for the battle near the mouth of the Pinarus River and south of the village ofIssus. Darius was apparently unaware that, by deciding to stage the battle on a river bank, he was minimizing the numerical advantage his army had over Alexander's. Initially, Alexander chose what was apparently unfavorable ground. This surprised Darius who mistakenly elected to hold the wrong position while Alexander instructed his infantry to take up a defensive posture. Alexander personally led the more elite Greek Companion cavalry against the Persian left up against the hills, and cut up the enemy on the less encumbering terrain generating a quick rout. After achieving a breakthrough, Alexander demonstrated he could do the difficult and held the cavalry successfully in check after it broke the Persian right. Alexander then mounted his beloved horse Bucephalus at the head of his Companion cavalry and led a direct assault against Darius. The horses that were pulling Darius' chariot were injured, and began tossing at the yoke. Darius, about to fall off his chariot, instead jumped off. He tossed off his royal diadem, mounted a horse, and fled the scene. The Persian troops, realizing they had lost, either surrendered or fled with their hapless king. The Macedonian cavalry pursued the fleeing Persians for as long as there was light. As with most ancient battles, significant carnage occurred after the battle as pursuing Macedonians slaughtered their crowded, disorganized foe. TheBattle of Issus occurred in southern Anatolia, in November 333 BC. The invading troops led by Alexander, were outnumbered more than 2:1, defeated the army personally led by Darius III of AchaemenidPersia.The battle was a decisive Macedonian victory and it marked the beginning of the end of Persian power. It was the first time the Persian army had been defeated with the King (Darius III at the time) present. Darius left his wife and an enormous amount of treasure behind as his army fled. The greed of the Macedonians helped to persuade them to keep going, as did the large number of Persian concubines and prostitutes they picked up in the battle.
Darius, by now fearing for both his throne and his life, sent a letter to Alexander where he promised to pay him a substantial ransom in exchange for his prisoners of war, agreed to sign a treaty of alliance with Alexander, and agreed to give to Alexander half of his empire. Darius received a response from Alexander, which began "King Alexander to Darius". In the letter, Alexander blamed Darius for his father's death and claimed Darius to be a vulgar usurper who planned to take Macedonia. He agreed to return the prisoners without ransom, but told Darius that he and Alexander were not equals, and that Darius was to address Alexander as "King of all Asia". He also told Darius that, if he wanted to dispute Alexander's claim to the Achaemenid throne, that he would have to stand and fight Alexander, but if he fled, Alexander would pursue and kill him. By this, Alexander revealed for the first time that his plan was to conquer the entire Persian Empire. After that, Alexander marched into Egypt. The Egyptians hated the Persians, in part because Persia considered Egypt as nothing more than one big bread basket. They welcomed Alexander as their king, placed him on the throne of the Pharaohs, giving him the crown of Upper and Lower Egypt, and named him the incarnation of Ra and Osiris. He set in motion plans to buildAlexandria, and, though future tax revenues would be channeled to him, he left Egypt under the management of Egyptians, which helped to win him their support.
Name of Alexander the Great in Egyptian hieroglyphs (written from right to left), circa 330 BC, Egypt
During the two years after the Battle of Issus, Alexander proceeded to occupy theMediterranean coast and Egypt. He then advanced from Syria against the heart of the Persian empire. Alexander crossed both theEuphrates and the Tigris rivers without any opposition. Darius was building up a massive army, drawing men from all parts of his empire. He gathered more than 250,000 soldiers (including more than 42,000 cavalry) against approximately 47,000 Macedonian soldiers (including around 8,000 cavalry).Just before the battle, Darius offered Alexander a generous peace agreement. Darius would cede half of the entire Persian Empire provided Alexander cease his invasion of Persia. When presented to Alexander, he declined the offer without any consideration at all.
40,000 (according to Curtius Rufus) 47,000 (according to Welman)90,000 (according to Diodorus Siculus) 300,000+ captured (according to Arrian)
On the eve of battle, Alexander's generals including Parmenion suggested that to counter the overwhelming number of Persians, a surprise night attack should be launched. Alexander dismissed this idea, proclaiming that he would not "steal his victory". As it turned out Alexander's dismissal of the night attack option was either a lucky move, or a stroke of genius. Darius, fearing a night attack, kept his army awake and on alert for the whole night, while Alexander's was allowed to sleep. The next morning, Alexander himself over-slept. When his concerned generals woke him, he stated matter-of-factly that the battle had already been won.Darius chose a flat, open plain where he could deploy his numerically superior forces, not wanting to be caught in a narrow battlefield as he had been at Issus two years earlier, where he was unable to properly deploy his huge army. Darius also had his soldiers flatten the terrain prior to the battle, so as to give his 200 war-chariots optimal conditions to operate in. However this did not matter. On the ground were few hills and no bodies of water that Alexander could use for protection, and in the autumn the weather was dry and mild.The most commonly accepted opinion about the location is east of Mosul in modern-day northern Iraq.
Now you are about to see the view that the generals wish to have, and see the Phalanx infanty and the Companion cavalry of Macedon against the scythed chariots the diversity of Cavaly and the thousands of troops from all corners of the Persian Empire, the fight will decide the future of Persian Empire and the Kingdom of Macedon and the Macedonian kingdom and the Greek city-states, and the world will not be the same before!